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1Exploring Demographic Factors Affecting Passage of Living Wage Ordinances 
Cities that have passed living wages have generally done so in response to a couple of
things: First that the national minimum wage has failed to keep pace with inflation and thus is
insufficient to enable low-wage workers to adequately support themselves. And second that
municipalities have outsourced service jobs once performed by higher paid unionized workers to
contractors whose employees are paid considerably less. To some extent, these two trends are
well captured in the larger economic transformations that have plagued many of the nation’s 
cities over the years: mainly the exodus of manufacturing based employment and its replacement
with a service economy. Moreover, this has all occurred against the larger backdrop of rising
income and wage inequality. Though there are clearly objective factors that may explain what
grass roots living wage campaigns have been reacting to, what has not been addressed are the
characteristics of those cities that have passed ordinances. That is, are there no other reasons for
why some cities might be more likely to pass these ordinances than others?
Invariably, there are a whole host of variables that go into a city’s ultimate adoption of a
living wage ordinance, most notably its political culture and the nature of its political regime. To
explore that aspect is clearly beyond the parameters of this paper. At the same time there are
other factors, most notably the structure of its labor market and the demographics of that labor
market, that may predispose it more to the adoption of such ordinances. In other words, the
political campaigns for living wages that occur at the local level are no doubt a response to the
changing economic circumstances, which ultimately provides them with their strongest political
appeal. But it is also possible that the characteristics of these cities that are more predisposed to
2passing such ordinances also give these political appeals more traction. This obviously cannot be 
completely proven simply by comparing respective labor market characteristics, they are
nonetheless suggestive, and for this reason greater exploration is warranted.  
In this paper, I examine some of those features on the basis of data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) by comparing cities that passed ordinances to those that did not. What I
intend to show is the following: cities with certain demographics, particularly higher
concentrations of immigrants from south of the American border, lower levels of educational
attainment, more people in low wage industries, and higher rates of income inequality, appear to
be more likely to pass living wage ordinances than those cities that do not have these
demographics. This, of course, would raise the further question of what would be more important
in explaining why some cities are more predisposed to passing ordinances over others.  Is it the
various demographic variables or the level of income inequality? And for that matter, what do
these variables necessarily have to do with the efforts of  local organizers to mobilize grass-roots
campaigns in response? Do growing inequalities in urban labor markets create incentives for
collective action to launch living wage campaigns? 
Data from the CPS cannot easily answer this last question, but to the extent that
demographic variables may explain why some cities have greater income inequality than others,
it perhaps answers the question in an indirect way. This is not to say, however, that these cities’
demographic factors are themselves the causes of living wage campaigns. Rather, growing
income inequality, also perhaps related to certain demographic features,  may create pressure for
some collective action. That is, I want to suggest that cities that have passed ordinances have
certain characteristics that perhaps do presuppose them to being exploited by these political
3campaigns. At the same time, the specific demographics of labor markets in those cities that
passed ordinances may also more easily lend themselves to the type of grassroots organizing of
workers that many living wage campaigns appear to be predicated on. The data does make clear,
however, that cities with large immigrant populations with low educational attainment are thus
more likely to have sizeable labor markets at the low-end of the income distribution. As such,
these cities may only offer greater opportunity for living wage campaigns to organize these
workers, who, because they are at the bottom of the wage scale, also have greater incentive to
join in living wage campaigns because they are in a position to benefit. To the extent that this can
be shown from the data, it would also imply the converse: those cities with smaller populations
that are likely to be working in the low-wage labor market are perhaps less likely to be organized
because the potential for mobilization is also less. Also because there are higher percentages of
people who are better positioned to earn better wages, there is less incentive to be supportive of
such campaigns. In other words, growing income inequality in urban labor markets, particularly
with specific demographic profiles, may, because of the nature of those profiles, effectively
create incentives for collective action to launch living wage campaigns.
Living Wages and Income Inequality?
To the extent that living wage campaigns may be reacting to rising income inequality, it
might then be assumed that there is reason to believe that living wage ordinances, as yet another
labor market institution, may go a long way towards at least slowing the increase in income
inequality. At a minimum, it should reduce income inequality at the bottom of the income
distribution. In other words, aside from the question of fairness and economic justice, do
4campaign organizers assume there to be a relationship between institutional settings, labor
market structures and the adoption of redistributive policy interventions? Although this question
has not specifically been addressed with regards to the living wage, there is some general support
for the notion that wage policies can reduce income inequality. On this, some of the literature on
the effects of labor market institutions such as unions and the minimum wage is quite
informative. 
Inequality, in short, tends to be less in places with labor market institutions (Howell and
Huebler 1999). But once such institutions begin to deteriorate, rising income inequality is by no
means an unexpected outcome. Overall, the literature suggests that wage institutions in
general—specifically minimum wages and unions—do make a difference in reducing income
inequality because they effectively boost the wages of those at the bottom of the distribution. It is
suggestive because it is based on the effect that the deterioration of these institutions has had on
the income distribution, not necessarily because it has been demonstrated that the presence has
resulted in less income inequality. Rather income inequality was actually found to have increased
in places where labor market institutions like unions and the minimum wage have deteriorated
(Freeman 1993; Lee 1997; Machin 1997). Different institutions also appear to affect men and
women differently. Nicole Fortin and Thomas Lemieux (1997), for instance, found wage
inequality among men to be affected by a decline in unions, while wage inequality specifically
among women was affected by the decline in the minimum wage.
Tom Palley (1999) found that between 1980 and 1997, the gini coefficient increased by
17.5 percent and that 40 percent of this increase was due to a decline in union density and 9
percent was attributable to a decline in the real value of the minimum wage. He suggests that
5unions in particular check income inequality by promoting the creation of wage contours that
effectively raise the wages of all those with similar skills within the same occupational
categories. They also reduce income inequality by restraining inequality within firms.  Within
firm inequality has increased because of the declining strength of unions, which has only had
spillover effects into the general labor market. Consequently, new wage contours are created that
favor managerial and professional occupations. Similarly, Oren Levin-Waldman (2002) found
that individuals were more likely to earn wages within a range of the statutory minimum wage in
states with right-to-work laws (labor market institutions that effectively suppress wages) than
states with high union density. Wages for those in high union density states tended to be higher
than in right-to-work states. Just as there were institutions to boost wages, there were also
institutions to suppress wages, thereby implying that institutions do make a difference.
Centralized types of wage setting institutions lead to a more equal wage distribution, and when
these institutions are in decline the wage distribution is more likely to become unequal (Piore
1995; Gordon 1996; DiNardo and Lemieux 1997; Galbraith 1998; Palley 1998; Lemieux 1998;
Wallerstein 1999; Craypo and Cormier 2000). 
All this, then, implies a clear role for living wage ordinances as a tool for potentially
reducing income inequality, not because they will significantly narrow the gap between the top
and bottom, but because studies suggest that income inequality is less when the average income
of those at the bottom rises at a faster rate than those at the top. According to Peter Gottschalk
(1997), decreasing income inequality can be accounted for by greater income growth among
those at the bottom. Income inequality actually increases when the growth of income is greater
among those at the top than among those at the bottom, even though bottom incomes have
6improved in absolute terms. While mean wages grew rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s the
dispersion around the growing mean changed very little. So long as those at the bottom of the
income distribution gained along with everyone else from secular growth in the mean, it was a
foregone conclusion that poverty rates would be kept down.
On the basis of data from the CPS between 1991 and 1998, Levin-Waldman (2001) found
that when  compared to New York, Philadelphia and Denver, income inequality in Baltimore
actually decreased quite substantially, and in large part because the average incomes of families
in the bottom quintile rose at a considerably higher rate than those in the top quintile. Compared
to the nation as a whole, income inequality in New York City, as measured by the ratio of
families in the top fifth of the income distribution to the bottom fifth of the distribution, was 22.9 
the end of 1998. This compares to a ratio of 14.2 for the country as a whole. Whereas income
inequality increased by 21.4 percent in the United States during the 1990s, it increased by 29.4
percent in New York City. Income inequality also increased by 36.8 percent in Denver and by as
much as 64.3 percent in Philadelphia, where the top-to-bottom ratio was 20.2 at the end of 1998.
In Baltimore, where the first Living Wage ordinance was passed in 1994, income inequality
actually dropped by 23.4 percent. Similarly, income inequality also dropped by 6.4 percent in San
Francisco, where various municipal authorities within the city have also passed Living Wage
ordinances. Though it is not clear that Living Wage ordinances per se were responsible for these
decreases, it is important to note that income inequality did drop in those two cities because the
average income of those at the bottom increased by a higher percentage (26.7 percent in
Baltimore and 19.8 percent in San Francisco) than the average incomes of those at the top (2.3
percent in Baltimore and 13.0 percent in San Francisco) (38-39).
7Though the number of studies on the living wage have grown in recent years, still very
little is known about just what its effects would be. Among the more theoretically comprehensive
studies is one by David Neumark (2002). Neumark examines CPS data and attempts to look at
the effects of the living wage by comparing changes in cities that have passed living wages with
those that have not. Among his findings are that poverty in those cities that passed living wage
ordinances was less than in those cities that did not pass such ordinances. The principal problem
with this approach, of course, is that while correlations may be established with the living wage,
causal relationships cannot be. At best, this approach only lends itself to inference, but it by no
means establishes that poverty in those cities was less because they passed a living wage.
Nevertheless, his findings also suggest that in those cities where living wage ordinances were
passed there were also sizeable wage gains among low-wage workers, and that above the 10th
percentile level, there was no evidence of disemployment effects. Rather, there was evidence of
positive employment effects between the 50th and 75th percentiles, which is also consistent with a
substitution of higher-skilled workers. Evidence on employment effects, however, was weaker
than evidence on wage effects (pp. 40-86). Neumark’s findings, however, shouldn’t be taken as
dispositive. While he concludes poverty to be reduced in cities with living wages, the best that he
can offer is a positive correlation. He cannot establish that poverty was in fact lower because of
the living wage. More to the point, however, because his econometric model relies on a truncated
sample of workers which excludes higher wage workers, there is the problem of sample selection
bias. As Mark Brenner, Jeannette Wicks-Lim and Robert Pollin (2002) point out, data from the
CPS simply cannot be used in this manner, because it  does not capture the actual experiences of
those cities that have adopted these ordinances. On the contrary, the CPS is individual level data
8and Neumark’s classification of workers as potentially covered may not be consistent with the
reality. He classifies workers as potentially covered because they may be legally receiving wages
as a function of these ordinances, but he provides no evidence that his assignment is consistent
with the actual experiences of those cities that have implemented these ordinances.
Living Wage as Efficiency Wage
During the early part of the twentieth century Sydney Webb (1912) argued that paying a
minimum wage would have the effect of increasing efficiency because workers would become
more efficient. The employer would have incentive to find ways to increase productivity either by
getting workers to produce more or by substituting technology for labor. But the worker would
also have incentive to improve his or her skills so that the value of his/her labor would justify the
new wage. Moreover, workers would also become more productive because a higher wage would
better enable them to maintain themselves physically, which in turn would sustain their morale.
The more contemporary view of efficiency wages holds that workers who receive higher wages
have a stronger incentive to hold onto their jobs because the costs associated with job loss are
now higher. Employers also benefit because the costs of higher wages are usually offset by
savings in monitoring costs (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1990). Recent studies on the effects of the
living wage are confirming some of these positive benefits. Aside from the projected
macroeconomic benefits of affording workers greater purchasing power that may also decrease
the public assistance roles, there are also the benefits to employers in the form of reduced
turnover, lower replacement, recruitment and training costs, and overall increases in productivity
(Howes 2002; Fairris 2003; Reich, Hall and Jacobs 2003). 
9In a study of the impact of the Los Angles living wage ordinance on employers, David
Fairris (2003) found that on the basis of both employee and employer surveys that the starting
wages for the largest low-wage occupations increased significantly among living wage
establishments than among non-living wage establishments with a difference of roughly $1.70
per hour. And yet higher labor costs were also offset by other savings due to reduced turnover.
Among workers in the largest lowest wage occupations, turnover decreased by roughly 50
percent. The average cost of replacing a low wage worker was reported to be $807 in the non-
living wage survey, and this included separation, search, training and lost productivity during the
time it took new workers to come up to speed. Therefore, Fairris calculated the per worker saving
to be $226 per workers assuming a turnover reduction from 49 to 21 percent. To then pay
workers an extra $1.80 per hour would amount to additional $3600 per year for each worker. The
savings in turnover costs, then, amounted to roughly six percent of the increased wage bill per
worker per year. On the other hand, to the extent that a two-tiered ordinance was designed to
encourage low-wage employers to provide health insurance, no change was found in the
incidence of employer-paid benefits to affected workers among city service contractors as a result
of the living wage ordinance. 
Similarly, in a study of the impact of the ordinance at San Francisco International Airport,
Michael Reich, Peter Hall, and Ken Jacobs (2003) found that despite a significant rise in overall
labor costs, there was also a significant decrease in labor turnover. The direct cost of
implementing the ordinance, which was also part of a larger Quality Standards Program (QSP) to
improve safety and security while also improving the labor market conditions at the airport, was
approximately $42.7 million a year. Spillover costs to other workers and employers added
10
another $14.9 million to employer costs. And yet, turnover fell by an average of 34 percent
among all surveyed firms and 60 percent among those firms where average wages increased 10
percent or more. The greatest reduction in turnover, however, was among airport security
screeners. During a fifteen month period after OSP was implemented in April 2000, turnover fell
by almost 80 percent from 94.7 percent to 18.7 percent. Every time an average worker has to be
replaced, employers have to pay about $4,275 per worker in turnover costs. Therefore, as a
function of raising wages, employers ended up saving $6.6 million each year in turnover costs.
To the extent that employers experienced reduced turnover costs, they experienced productivity
gains. Total observed wages increased by $56.6 million in annual wages for ground-based non-
management employees. Many reported that the quality of work increased, and many workers
themselves indicated that they were more inclined to put more effort into their work. 
Reich et. al. suggest yet another benefit that might accrue to the living wage. That is, to
the degree that living wage ordinances reduce worker turnover, they may also provide an
additional contribution to unionization. It becomes easier for unions to organize when there is a
stable workforce. Higher wages may increase the value of job security, seniority and the other
benefits attendant to unionization, and the living wage at San Francisco International appeared to
have provided benefit to union organizing when workers were directly involved in the campaigns
themselves and when contact with workers was made prior to the ordinance. 
Although overall employment costs did rise, Reich et. al. maintain that most of the
increased costs were absorbed by the airlines. And even had the unlikely assumption been made
that there were no offsetting productivity increases and that 100 percent of both direct and
indirect costs were passed through to consumers, the costs per worker amounts to a modest cost
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of $1.42 per airline customer. Moreover, there were no significant reductions in employment,
rather employment at the airport actually increased by around 15.6 percent during the period in
which QSP was implemented. But this may have had more to do with the unique attributes of the
airline labor market, and also that a new international terminal had been opened. 
When added to some of the earlier literature, albeit it was prospective, that estimated that
costs to cities of passing ordinances in terms of bidding and service contracts would be low
(Pollin and Luce 1998; Nissen with Cattan 1998; Benner and Rosner 1998; Zabin, Reich and
Hall 1999; Reynolds, Pearson and Vortkampf 1999), there are clearly reasons to believe that
living wages do make for good public policy. Moreover, the demonstrated benefits thus far may
well serve to garner essential political support. Still, it does not clue us into the characteristics of
those cities that have passed them. At issue are the specific characteristics of a city’s labor
market that would predispose it to passage of such an ordinance. In the remainder of this paper, I
look at the labor markets of selected cities that have passed these ordinances in an attempt to
understand just what some of those characteristics may be.
Comparative City Analysis
Data for this study is drawn from the March CPS files for 1993 and 2002. During that
nine year period, beginning with Baltimore in 1994, over eighty municipalities enacted living
wage ordinances of one type or another. Though some are more encompassing than others, basic
ordinances require that firms contracting with municipalities to perform municipal services pay
their workers a specified minimum wage. Living wage ordinances are not city wide minima, and
are thus limited in overall coverage. Hence the limited coverage also speaks to the limitations of
12
the CPS as a tool for analysis. Collected by the U.S. Census Bureau, the March annual
supplements contain data on family characteristics, household composition, sources of income,
industry and occupation of the job held the longest during the year, weeks worked, poverty and
other demographic variables. 
My purpose is not to look at specifically living wage workers, or those that necessarily
fall into living wage contours, but to compare those cities that passed ordinances to those that
have not on the basis of their respective labor market characteristics. I specifically look at about
30 cities across different regions that passed ordinances and compare them to about 30, also
across different regions, that did not that are similar in size and similar in terms of industrial and
occupational characteristics. Although there are limitations to this approach, as cities do each
have their unique features than cannot easily be quantified, it nonetheless reveals clear
differences that also clue us into some of the demographic differences that would more likely
predispose some cities towards passing ordinances over others. These differences, are primarily
in industry and occupational composition, educational attainment, and workers’ place of birth.
Nevertheless, because the basic unit of analysis is the individual, I only include those individuals
who are of working age, ranging from 16-69 years of age.
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Table I Ratio of Top and Bottom Fifths of Families in Living Wage Cities, Non-Living Wage Cities and the U.S.*
1993 2002
                   Average Income      Average Income    Top-to     Average Income      Average Income     Top-to-     Difference  Percent 
                              of Bottom Fifth         Top Fifth of       bottom      of Bottom Fifth         of Top Fifth         bottom                                    Change
                               of Families               of Families         Ratio         of Families             of Families           Ratio 
Cities that
Passed Living
Wage Ordinances       $7466              $ 98943        13.3              $11311 $166001             14.7                 1.4                 10.53
Cities that didn’t
pass ordinances       $9165                      $104130         11.4              $13541 $183193             13.5          2.1                 18.42                 
Entire Country**       $8388          $  93715         11.2              $11822 $156888             13.3          2.1                 18.75
Percent Change in Quintile
Bottom Top
LWO 51.5 67.8
NLWO 47.8 75.9
All 40.9 67.0
* While the unit of analysis in the CPS is the individual, family income represents the total family income of which individuals are a part of. So when comparing
the top fifth to the bottom fifth in 1993, for example, this means then is that 20 percent of individuals in this sample are in families where the average total
income was $7466 compared to another 20 percent who were in families where the average total income was $98943. Family incomes are in real terms for each
sample year.
** Entire Country refers to all individuals in the Annual M arch CPS sample, whereas the other two categories refer to only those individuals in each category’s
respective 30 cities.
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Among the first features to stand out is that income inequality in cities that passed ordinances
was certainly higher in 1993 prior to passage of the first ordinance. And as Table 1 suggests,
passage of ordinances in these cities by no means reversed the trend. Though it cannot be
concluded that living wages reduced income inequality over those cities that did not pass them, it
would nonetheless appear that percentage growth was less in those cities that passed them over
those that did not. Whereas family income inequality rose by 18.42 percent between 1993-2002
in cities that did not pass ordinances and by 18.75 percent in the rest of the country, it only rose
by 10.53 percent in those cities that did pass ordinances. 
One reason for greater income inequality in living wage cities over non-living wage cities
may be that the living wage cities are simply larger and thus have larger and more diversified
populations. There is some literature on cross city comparisons to suggest that a key factor
affecting income variation across cities is city size itself. This is generally referred to as the
“Positive Correlation Thesis.” James Long, David Rasmussen and Charles Haworth (1977), for
instance, hold that increasing income inequality over time may be a function of increasing
population. Stephen Nord (1980), argues that incomes should be distributed more equally in mid
size cities. Income inequality can be expected to exhibit a “U” shaped trend over increasing city
sizes, with smaller and larger cities experiencing greater measures of inequality. On the one
hand, this may be because large cities tend to attract low-skilled workers. On the other hand,
larger and more densely populated areas might imply rising living costs which tend to be
compensated for by employers in the form of higher wages. It is also possible that the higher
wages found in larger cities may also attract poor migrants who believe that is where their
economic opportunities lie. Moreover, larger cities tend to be where the more highly paid
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workers with advanced technical and professional skills tend to gravitate. Meanwhile, Andreas
Stich (1999), on the basis of data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) for the years
1991-1995, found that the Gini index showed income inequality to not be dependent on city size
in Germany. Comparing West German cities to East German cities, there was little evidence for
the positive correlation hypothesis in the West, and in the East, there was no relationship at all
between inequality and city size. In terms of population, cities that passed ordinances have a
larger average size than those cities that did not, which might only add support to the “Positive
Correlation Hypothesis.” Size, however, does not speak to the specific population demographics
or the extent to which there is diversity in that population.
Even though there was more income inequality in those cities that passed ordinances, and
it remained high in 2002 even after ordinances were passed, the rate of growth did decline in
those cities. The lower rate of growth in income inequality would appear to be accounted for in
part by the higher percentage increase in average family income among those in the bottom
Quintile in those cities that passed ordinances. Still, it remains unclear as to whether this higher
percentage increase is in any way attributable to the living wage ordinances. Nevertheless,  it is
revealing that income inequality is by all appearances a bigger problem in those cities’ that
passed ordinances. And it also appears to be an important characteristic of those cities’ respective
labor markets. Although this does not account for family size, my purpose is simply to present a
general overview of income inequality. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that family size
is going to vary much across cities.  As to whether this is a key determining factor is, it is of
course, an open question. There are certainly other factors that need to be explored.
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Table 2 Selected Comparative Demographics between Living Wage Cities and Non Living Wage Cities
            1993 2002
   Living Wage     Non-Living           Living Wage            Non-Living
           Cities     Wage Cities                           Cities                Wage Cities
Origin
Mexican American    4.6          3.1     3.3   2.2
Chicano      .2           0       .2     .1
Mexican (Mexicano)    8.0          2.5     9.5   5.5
Puerto Rican     3.9          1.3     2.1   1.6
Cuban    2.5            .3     1.6     .2 
Central or South American        5.7           2.1     5.2   3.0
Other Spanish    1.8            .8     1.5     .8
All Other              73.1        89.3   75.2             85.1 
Don’t Know      .2            .6       .2     .3
NA      .1            .1     1.1   1.1
Education
11th Grade or less   21.9         16.3    19.0 17.0
12th grade, no diploma     2.8           2.3            2.2               1.6 
High School graduate   29.3                     31.0    26.6 26.7   
Some College, no degree   18.1         19.6    18.4 18.8
Associate Degree     6.2           5.8      7.2   6.9
B.A. degree   14.3         16.2    17.8 18.8 
Graduate or Professional
degree     7.4           8.9      8.6 10.2
All statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level.
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In looking at the demographic profile of a community’s labor market, there are several
factors that need to be addressed such as educational attainment, age of working population,
family income levels, gender, race, origin of birth, and composition of both industry and
occupation. In comparing living wage cities to non-living wage cities, however, there are two
particular demographic features, as can be seen in Table 2, that are really critical. Racial
differences between living wage and non-living wage cities are not very large. In both, the
majority are white (79.5  v. 81.2 percent in 1993 and 75.3  v. 76.2 percent in 2002). And in both
types of cities blacks were the second largest group (13.9  v. 14.0 percent in 1993 and 17.0 v.
17.9 percent in 2002). Living wage cities, however, did have more Asians and Pacific Islanders
(5.3 v. 3.3 percent in 1993 and 7.0 v. 4.9 percent in 2002) than non-living wage cities. But the
major difference between these cities lies in the place where people were born and educational
attainment.
Living wage cities have larger immigrant populations, particularly from Central and
South America, than do non-living wage cities. Differences between living wage and non-living
wage cities are great among Mexican Americans, Mexicans, Central or South Americans, and
Cubans. Meanwhile, those cities that did not pass living wage ordinances have a higher
percentage of individuals whose place of origin was someplace else, which, while it would
include those born in any other country outside those specifically listed, would also include those
born in the United States. Therefore, if there are more immigrants in Living Wage cities, and they
are coming with little skills, we might account for the greater inequality in those cities on the
basis of Nord’s argument that the attraction of individuals with lower skills will result in greater
inequality because their increasing numbers effectively suppresses wages at the bottom of the
18
distribution.
Educational attainment also appears to be higher in those cities that did not pass
ordinances than those that did, although the differences between them does narrow between
1993-2002. Whereas in 1993 21.9 percent of individuals in living wage cities had no more than
an 11th grade education compared to 16.3 percent in non-living wage cities, only 19 percent had
no more than an 11th grade education in living wage cities compared to 17 percent in non-living
wage cities in 2002. The percentages of those who have undergraduate and/or post-graduate
degrees is higher in non-living wage cities than living wage cities. Peripherally this would then
imply more people in higher paying occupations and industries in those cities that did not pass
ordinances than in those cities that did, thereby suggesting that there was perhaps less of a need
in those cities for such ordinances. Or to state it the other way, to the extent that there is a
relationship between low educational attainment and low wage levels, or the greater probability
of being employed in low wage occupations, we might infer that the wages of those at the bottom
are lower in those cities that passed ordinances because educational levels are lower, thereby
implying a greater need for labor market institutions. 
On this question, Barry Chiswick (1991) suggests that there is a correlation between low
earnings, a dearth of skills and language ability. Though a growing literature on economic
adjustment or economic assimilation of immigrants is focused on human capital, one important
aspect of human capital is actually “language capital.” Immigrants who don’t know the language
may find what he refers to as a language minority enclave, which, while it provides them with a
network of support, also limits their training opportunities and job mobility. Immigrants
generally come to the United States with very poor English language skills. Nearly 80 percent of
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Mexican men, however, reported that they could not speak English at all, while another 20
percent indicated that they spoke “not well.” Mexicans also reported very low skills in reading
English. To the extent that this is true, it is only a foregone conclusion that Mexicans, at least
when they first arrive in the U.S., regardless of whether they are legal or illegal, are only bound
to wind up at the bottom of the wage distribution because English reading ability among low-
skilled immigrants is related to their overall skill level.
As to why these cities would be more likely to attract immigrants, as well as having
greater numbers with no more than an 11th grade education, the data suggests that living wage
cities actually have more people working in industries and occupations that on the surface, at
least, would not appear to require that much skill. Non-living wage cities have more people
employed in Executive, Managerial, and Professional Specialty occupations (11.4 v. 9.4 percent
in 1993 and 14.4 v. 11.3 percent in 2002), while living wage cities have more people employed
as Machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors (5.0 v. 3.5 percent in 1993 and 3.9 v. 2.9
percent in 2002). In fact, this was the only occupational category in which living wage cities had
more people working than non-living wage cities. Living wage cities also have more people
employed in both the Durable and Non-Durable goods industries, as well as services. Therefore,
to the extent that there is a relationship between low educational attainment and low wage levels,
or the greater probability of being employed in low wage occupations, we might infer that the
wages of those at the bottom are lower in those cities that passed ordinances because educational
levels are lower, thereby implying a greater need for labor market institutions—institutions that
will boost wages.. 
In terms of family income, it is interesting to note that a higher percentage of individuals
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in families with incomes of less than $20,000 are in those cities (28.4 percent in 1993 and 30
percent in 2002) that passed ordinances than those that did not (21.8 percent in 1993 and 24
percent in 2002). While the percentage of families with incomes of less than $20,000 did grow in
both living wage and non-living wage cites during this time frame, it appears to have grown at a
lower rate in living wage cities despite the fact that overall living wage cities continued to have
more families with incomes below this threshold.  If it could be assumed that those in families
whose incomes are between $15,000-19,999 fall within a living wage range, the percentage is
greater in living wage cities than non-living wage cities.
This, then, returns us to the question of just what is it about those cities that have already
passed ordinances that made them more likely to pass them? Data show that living wage cities
have higher percentages of ethnic and/or immigrant groups, as well as higher percentages of
individuals with no more than an 11th grade education. It is true that educational attainment and
skills are not the same thing, but to the extent that educational attainment does speak to a skills
level, are we then to infer that these cities have higher concentrations of individuals with lower
skills, in which case their wage rates are lower? And therefore, their need for a wage boost is
greater?  Is there not a relationship between educational attainment and origin of birth? Do we
then infer that low wage rates are the result of a lack of skills and that ethnic and immigrant
groups are less likely to possess these skills? In other words, what is the correlation between
educational attainment and origin of birth? Do we also infer that those cities that did not pass
ordinances did not do so because the need was not perceived to be as great as evidenced by a
higher average family income among the bottom in the those cities that did not pass ordinances?
As living wage cities have larger immigrant populations as well as more people with no
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more than an 11th grade education than non-living wage cities, the question arises as to whether
there is a relationship between these two variables. Table 3 compares people’s place of birth by
educational attainment for both living wage and non-living wage cities. 
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Table 3 Educational Attainment by Birth of Origin (Percentages)
11th grade or
less
12th grade,
no diploma
H.S.
Graduate
Some
College
Associate
Degree
B.A. Graduate or
Professional
1993 LW NLW LW NLW LW NLW LW NLW LW NLW LW NLW LW NLW
Mexican
American
33.4 38.1 4.8 1.8 31.7 32.1 17.3 16.8 7.2 2.1 3.3 6.5 2.3 2.6
Chicano 26.7 0 6.7 0 33.3 100.0 20.0 0 6.7 0 6.7 0 0 0
Mexican 69.5 70.2 3.5 2.9 16.5 16.8 6.2 5.5 1.8 1.3 1.9 2.3 .5 1.0
Puerto Rican 41.4 31.3 5.3 3.8 28.8 38.1 14.8 13.8 3.9 2.5 4.3 5.6 1.3 5.0
Cuban 31.0 5.7 2.6 5.7 25.1 28.6 18.4 31.4 8.4 2.9 9.7 20.0 4.8 5.7
Central or
South
American
34.9 42.0 5.4 1.2 25.4 22.6 17.3 15.7 8.1 8.8 8.7 15.7 3.5 4.9
All Other 13.4 13.1 2.2 2.3 31.1 31.4 19.6 20.4 6.7 6.0 17.7 17.2 9.4 9.5
DK 15.8 20.5 5.3 0 31.6 37.0 23.7 12.3 10.5 9.6 10.5 13.7 2.6 6.8
NA 15.8 5.6 5.3 5.6 31.6 44.4 21.1 11.1 5.3 0 15.8 27.8 5.3 5.6
2002
Mexican
Americans
25.5 34.7 3.8 2.1 34.3 28.0 21.4 16.7 8.1 5.4 6.2 10.3 .9 2.9
Chicano 28.6 51.6 5.4 3.2 28.6 25.8 10.6 6.5 3.1 3.2 7.1 6.5 5.4 3.2
Mexican 52.7 58.2 4.5 4.1 23.5 22.2 10.6 7.5 3.1 2.8 4.0 4.l 1.6 1.1
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Puerto Rican 34.7 35.8 3.9 3.3 27.6 24.8 17.0 15.9 5.4 6.6 7.7 9.0 3.7 4.6
Cuban 22.4 9.3 2.0 1.9 36.0 24.1 10.6 16.7 8.1 13.0 15.5 11.1 5.4 24.1
Central or
South
American
37.3 42.3 3.3 2.9 26.8 24.1 14.2 15.0 5.4 3.1 9.2 9.3 3.8 3.2
Other Spanish 32.4 31.4 6.4 1.0 27.7 24.2 15.4 14.9 5.9 6.2 9.6 13.6 2.7 8.8
All Other 12.5 12.6 1.7 1.4 26.4 27.1 19.9 19.9 7.9 7.4 21.1 20.5 10.4 11.3
DK 23.1 17.1 0 3.7 34.6 36.6 11.5 14.6 5.8 4.9 13.5 11.0 11.5 12.2
NA 10.8 6.9 .4 1.4 27.6 30.7 19.0 16.6 7.9 9.4 22.9 24.5 11.5 10.5
Statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level
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Relative to their presence in the general population, a disproportionate percentage of Mexicans
have attained no more than an 11th grade education. And this is true in both living wage and non-
living wage cities (69.5 percent v. 21.9 percent in living wage cities and 70.2 percent v. 16.3
percent in 1993 in non-living wage cities). Even though there is a decline from 1993-2002, the
percentage of Mexicans with no more than an 11th grade education still remains high relative to
the overall population (52.7 percent v. 19 percent in living wage cities and 58.2 percent v. 17
percent in non living wage cities). Mexicans are only followed by Puerto Ricans and those from
central and South American countries. Although the “all other” category is largely undefined, it
presumably includes those born in countries other than those specifically south of the American
border. This, of course, would imply, that it includes those who were born in the United States,
Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. What is important about this particular category is
that compared to the others, it has the lowest percentage of individuals with no more than an 11th
grade education in both living wage and non-living wage cities. It also has among the highest
percentages of individuals who have attained a B.A. degree and beyond, including a graduate
and/or professional degree.
Overall comparisons between those cities that passed living wage ordinances and those
that did not, then, lead one to believe that cities with both higher percentages of individuals with
no more than an 11th grade education, coupled with higher concentrations of ethnic and/or
immigrant groups, particularly south of the American border, are more likely to pass ordinances.
They may also be more likely to be in the first quintile, which for the purposes of analysis in this
paper will also serve as a proxy for being at the bottom end of the wage distribution. At best, we
can speculate that those most likely to fall into the first quintile of the income distribution and
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those who fall into a living wage income range are most likely to derive benefit from living wage
ordinances because 1) there may be wage contour effects, and 2) it is a population amenable to
being organized by the typical living wage campaign. Because they lack the educational
attainment necessary to command higher wages, they are effectively consigned to the low-wage
economy. This would also appear to be consistent with much of the general literature on
immigration generally, and that focusing on Mexicans and Central Americans more specifically.
That is, the general economic situation of immigrants starts off badly but improves as the
newcomer learns the ropes, acquires the requisite skills, and otherwise discovers how to send
employers the right signals. While Mexican immigrants who came in the 1960s consistently
moved ahead from decade to decade, the cohort that came in the 1970s did not fare as well. The
earnings of Mexicans and Central Americans particularly lagged behind those of native born
workers. But they also had lower per capita income and more children growing up in poverty
because their households do contain lots of children (Waldinger 1999). 
Significant differences in recent cohorts of Mexican immigrants relative to other groups
also suggest that they indeed possess fewer skills than those that arrived from Mexico previously.
Recent immigrants from Mexico are more likely to come from the lower end of the educational
and income distribution, and that patterns of low earnings among Mexican immigrants can be
partly explained by lower skill and educational levels among recent arrivals relative to Mexicans
born in the United States (Padilla and Glick 2000). Moreover, there appears to be a self-
reinforcing engine at work. Lower-skilled immigrants not only find low-level jobs, but the
structure of their employment is such that it also limits the rewards to  additional gains in
employment. According to Waldinger and Gilbertson (1994), whereas foreign born Mexican men
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only gained a 1.1 increment in occupational status for each additional year of schooling, the
increment for the same schooling was 4.6 for native whites born to native born parents.  In other
words, it may be possible to conjecture that it is the composition of the bottom quintiles in terms
of educational attainment and place of birth that affect whether a city is more likely to pass living
wage ordinances. And to the extent that typical living wage campaigns are about organizing
workers, particularly those at the bottom of the distribution, the correlation between these
variables may provide some important clues to understanding why some cities may be more
predisposed to adopting these ordinances. Consequently, there are a couple of different issues
that need to be sorted through. First, there is the issue of what factors are most likely to
predispose one to either being in the first quintile or falling within a living wage income range,
neither of which is mutually exclusive. The second has to do with those factors likely to result in
their passing ordinances. 
To determine which variables are more likely to predispose one to either being in the first
quintile of falling within a living wage income range, I performed a logistical regression analysis
on these dependent variables. Since living wage cities appear to have larger immigrant
populations, most specifically Mexicans, it makes sense to test for the effects of being Mexican
on both the likelihood of falling into a living wage category and being in the first quintile. But on
the assumption that the category of other nationalities will include both those from regions other
than Spanish speaking countries in Central America and those born in the United States, that
needs to be tested as well. Arguably a key factor for why living wage cities may have higher
concentrations in both these categories is race, but the data revealed there to be no significant
differences between living wage and non-living wage cities on the basis of race. Nevertheless, I
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test for the effects of race as a control against immigrant status. The control against both race and
immigrant status is educational attainment, specifically a low educational attainment. All these
factors may account for why income inequality appears to be greater in living wage cities over
non-living wage cities, but the composition of industry and occupation may also be important
factors as well. Living wage cities appear to have more people working in both durable goods
and non-durable goods than do non-living wage cities. Moreover, they also appear to have more
people working as machine operators, assemblers and inspectors, as well as handlers, equipment
cleaners, helpers and laborers than do non-living wage cities. And on even closer inspection, it
appears that Mexicans in particular are more likely to be in precisely those occupational
categories. Another important difference is that living wage cities have higher percentages of
individuals who have never worked than do non-living wage cities. Hence this is a factor that
needs to be tested as well. The larger point, however, is that because living wage cities appear to
have more such jobs, might that be a reason why Mexicans are gravitating towards them.
The purpose of the logistical regression analysis is to determine which variables are more
likely to predispose one to either being in the first quintile or falling within a living wage family
income range. Based on the size of the coefficients, they can establish which variables are likely
to have greater effect. In other words, all they establish are probabilities; they do not establish
how much more likely one is to fall into either category based on the size of the coefficient. The
analysis is specifically designed to determine which variables have a greater effect, or which ones
have a greater probability in resulting in something. It is not to determine how much more of the
dependent variable can result given say an increase in units of a particular independent variable.
And this is the reason that no continuous variables have been included in the analysis. In the
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pages that follow, I present three sets of regression coefficients, which when considered within
the context of a taxonomy, show some powerful effects. The first set of coefficients simply tests
for those variables that are more likely to predispose one to either fall within a living wage family
income range or the first quintile. The second then takes those variables that have relatively
positive effects for falling within either and tests whether they may account for who is perhaps
more likely to live in a city that passed a living wage ordinance. The second set of coefficients 
demonstrate that Mexicans, in particular, as well as those with no more than an 11th grade
education, are more likely to live in living wage cities. Consequently, the third set tests the
effects of such variables against the likelihood of working either in the occupational categories of
machine operators, assemblers and inspectors; and handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers and
laborers; or the industrial categories of both durable and non-durable goods. The reason for this
third set is specifically because both of these occupational and industrial categories had higher
percentages of individuals in living wage cities than non-living wage cities. All equations are
based on each variable being set to a value of 1. Each table will present the logit coefficients,
with their statistical significance directly below in parenthesis. The independent variables are as
follows:
LOED = Those with no more than an 11th grade educational attainment.
HIGHSCH = Those who have graduated High School with a diploma.
MALE = men
WHITE = Caucasians
BLACK = blacks/African Americans
MEXICAN = Those indicating a Mexican origin of birth
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OTHERNA = Those whose place of birth was in the category of other nationalities
NEVERWORK = Those who indicated that they never worked.
HANDLER = Those working as either handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers and
laborers.
DURGOOD = Those working in durable goods industry
LVWGCITY = Those living in a city that passed an ordinance (in 1993 those that lived in
a city that would pass such an ordinance).
LIVWGINC = Those living in families whose family incomes fall within what might be
considered a living wage range.
FIRSTQOR = Those in the first quintile living in cities that passed living wage
ordinances.
Table 4 Logistical Regression Coefficients—First Set 
Living Wage  First Quintile
Income Range
                      1993          2002 1993                 2002
HANDLER      .252                     .298  .466                 .551
                                           (.000)*                 (.000)                   (.000)              (.000)
MALE                            -.036                    -.077                    -.205                -.221
                                           (.076)                   (.001)                   (.000)              (.000) 
BLACK                           .218                      .231                     .580                 .471
                                           (.000)                   (.000)                   (.000)              (.000) 
LOED                              .404                      .351                     .798                 .526
                                           (.000)                   (.000)                   (.000)              (.000)
MEXICAN                       .557                     .411                     .618                 .651 
                                           (.000)                   (.000)                   (.000)               (.000)
OTHERNA                      .278                     .262                      .520                 .510
                                           (.001)                   (.005)                   (.000)               (.000) 
DURGOOD                    -.064                    -.022                    -.577                -.426 
                                           (.123)                   (.689)                   (.000)               (.000)
NEVERWORK               -.164                   -.010                    1.071                1.130       
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                                           (.000)                   (.701)                   (.000)              (.000)
WHITE                           -.119                     .019                     .332                 -.341 
                                           (.007)                   (.679 )                  (.000)              (.000)
FIRSTQOR                      .267                   1.878
                                           (.000)             (.000)
LVWGCITY              -.063                -.086
                                                                                                    (.004)              (.000)
LIVWGINC                                                                               .520                 1.914
                                                                                                    (.000)              (.000)
Constant                        -2.148                  -3.535 -1.687                -1.729
                                           (.000)                   (.000)                   (.000)              (.000)
* Values in parentheses denote statistical significance 
As Table 4 shows, low educational attainment appears to be a greater factor in explaining why
individuals are more likely to fall both within a living wage income range and the first quintile.
There is also a positive effect associated with being a handler, equipment cleaner, helper or
laborer for both falling within a living wage family income range and the first quintile.
Moreover, these effects only grow stronger in 2002. But as important a factor as race is for being
in the first quintile, immigrant status is actually a more important factor. Therefore, when
controlling for the effects of race and occupational categories, then, Mexicans and those with no
more than an 11th grade education are more likely to be in the first quintile. Moreover, being
Mexican has a greater effect for falling within a living wage income range. But for being in the
first quintile, having no more than an 11th grade education has a much stronger positive effect
than being Mexican in 1993, and that positive effect is not that much stronger in 2002. In fact the
positive effect of being Mexican for being in the first quintile is stronger in 2002 than 1993. Is
this because of the greater presence of Mexicans? And if so, can we say that there is perhaps a
relationship between increasing numbers of Mexicans and lower wage levels, particularly in the
first quintile? 
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Nevertheless, what really stands out is the relationship between falling within a living
wage family income range and being in the first quintile, particularly in 2002. In 1993, the
positive effect of this variable was stronger than being Mexican. Although the positive effect of
having never worked was relatively weak for falling within a living wage family income range, it
was quite substantial for being in the first quintile. In other words, the single greatest factor
explaining why one is in the first quintile in 1993 is that one never worked, followed by having
no more than an 11th grade education and being Mexican. By 2002, however, living in a family
whose family income falls within a living wage range is the single greatest factor explaining why
one would be in the first quintile, followed by having never worked, being Mexican and then
having no more than an 11th grade education. This, of course, clearly has implications for the role
of labor market institutions. It no doubt underscores the stagnation of wages, particularly those at
the bottom. At a minimum, a living wage, if it truly puts one and one’s family in a living wage
income range, will also be responsible for one being in the first quintile of the income
distribution, especially if there should be a rise in the bottom threshold of that quintile over time.
It might also suggest that despite the limited coverage, those in the bottom quintile are likely to
derive the benefit from living wage ordinances.
But can any of this tell us what it is about those cities that passed ordinances that
differentiates them from those cities that did not pass ordinances? Further logistical regression
coefficients with those variables that have positive effects for being in both a living wage income
range and the first quintile on being in a living wage city as the dependent variable are actually
quite suggestive. Again, each variable is equal to 1.
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Table 5 Logistical Regression Coefficients—Second Set
Living in a City that Passed Living Wage Ordinances
 1993 2002
HANDLER -.131                                        -.112
                                                    (.006)*                                     (.005)
BLACK                                    .628                                         .598
                                                    (.000)                                       (.000)   
LOED                                      -.051                                        .080
                                                    (.019)                                       (.000)
MEXICAN                             1.326                                        .981   
                                                    (.000)                                       (000)
OTHERNA                              .687                                        .526
                                                    (.000)                                       (.000)
NEVERWORK                        .216                                        .110
                                                    (.000)                                       (.000)
LIVWGINC                            -.155                                       -.177 
                                                    (.000)                                       (.000)
Constant                                 1.669                                     -1.712   
                                                    (.000)                                       (.000) 
* Vales in parentheses denote statistical significance
It will be recalled from Table 2 that cities that passed ordinances had higher percentages of
individuals who attained no more than an 11th grade education. These cities also had higher
percentages of individuals who had never worked. There were also slightly higher percentages of
those working as handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers and laborers.  But as these regression
coefficients show, low educational attainment had negative effects in both 1993 (also not
statistically significant) and in 2002. Working as a handler, equipment cleaner, helper or laborer
also had negative effects for being in a living wage city in both 1993 and 2002.  Although having
never worked had a positive effect for being in these cities, it was low relative to race and origin
of birth, and lower still in 2002. What really stands out from these results in particular is the
much greater probability of being in a living wage city  if one is Mexican than if one is black.  In
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other words, the positive effects of being Mexican are very strong in both 1993 and 2002.
Mexicans are more likely to be found in those cities that passed ordinances, and that this was true
in 1993 prior to the enactment of the first ordinance is perhaps suggestive of why these cities may
have been more susceptible to the appeals of their respective local living wage campaigns.
Of all factors, then, affecting whether one is more likely to be in the first quintile or fall
into a living wage family income range, only being Mexican is a real factor affecting whether one
is more likely to be in a living wage city. This only begs the question of why this might be a
factor in explaining why these cities were more predisposed to passing such ordinances. On this,
we might learn some more by further regressing some basic demographic variables on those
occupations and industries that appear to have a greater presence in those cities that passed living
wage ordinances over those that did not. Dependent variables for industries include both durable
and nondurable goods, and for occupation they include machine operators, assemblers, and
inspectors; and handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers and laborers. As with the other regressions,
variables again equal 1.
Table 6 Logistical Regression Coefficients—Third Set
                  Machine             Handlers,           Durable Goods Nondurable Goods
                                Operators,          Equipment
       Assemblers,        Cleaners, 
                               & Inspectors        Helpers &
                                                            Laborers 
1993
MALE          .418  1.566       1.133                            .403
                                    (.000)*                  (.000)                     (.000)                           (.000)
WHITE                   -.038                       .201                      .219                            .047
                                    (.568)                    (.026)                     (.000)                           (.000)
BLACK                    .313                       .474                      .062                            .221
                                    (.000)                    (.000)                     (.415)                           (.004)
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LOED                       .373                       .564                     -.362                          -.093 
                                    (.000)                    (.000)                     (.000)                           (.010)
MEXICAN               .902                       .358                      .417                            .750   
                                    (.000)                    (.000)                     (.000)                           (.000)
HIGHSCH                .331                       .695                     -.532                          -.043
                                    (.000)                    (.000)                     (.000)                           (.670)
Constant                -3.315                    -4.789                   -3.426                        -3.143
                                    (.000)                    (.000)                     (.000)                           (.000) 
2002
MALE          .603   1.400        1.079         .570
                                     (.000)                    (.000)                     (.000)                          (.000)
WHITE                   -.083                       .194                       .167                            .042
                                    (.136)                    (.001)                     (.000)                           (.449)
BLACK                    .205                       .057                     -.170                            .077
                                    (.002)                    (.400)                     (.004)                           (.245)
LOED                       .197                       .784                     -.587                          -.212 
                                    (.000)                    (.000)                     (.000)                           (.000)
MEXICAN                .786                      .575                      .186                            .628
                                    (.000)                    (.000)                     (.000)                           (.000)  
HIGHSCH                .269                       .605                     -.317                          -.189     
                                    (.004)                    (.000)                     (.001)                           (.081)
Constant                 -3.614                   -4.357                   -3.422                        -3.499
                                     (.000)                   (.000)                     (.000)                           (.000)
* Values in parentheses denote statistical significance
As these regression results suggest, Mexicans are more likely to work as machine operators,
assemblers and inspectors and in the nondurable goods industry. Relative to other factors, having
no more than an 11th grade education does not appear to have strong positive effects. When it
comes to both durable and nondurable goods, having no more than an 11th grade education has
negative effects. Those most likely to work as handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers and laborers
are more likely to be men. In fact, blacks are more likely to work in that occupational category
than are Mexicans, and having no more than an 11th grade education is likely to be a more
important factor in explaining why one is in that category.
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Conclusion
What, then, does this taxonomy tell us that might shed some light on why these cities may
have been more predisposed to passing such ordinances? First and foremost, these cities have
higher concentrations of immigrants from south of the American border, and that being in one of
these immigrant categories it is perhaps more likely that they will both fall into living wage
family income ranges and the first quintile of the income distribution. Mexicans, in particular, are
more likely to be in these two categories than are blacks and those whose origin of birth was
other.  But when controlling for the effects of having never worked, which was a strong factor for
why one would be in the first quintile, being Mexican had the strongest effect for being in a
living wage city. This, in and of itself, might be suggestive of why wages were lower in those
cities. But living wage cities also have higher percentages of lower paying occupations, which is
important because Mexicans also appear to be working as Machine operators, assemblers and
inspectors and in nondurable goods. The significance of greater income inequality in living wage
cities, coupled with higher concentrations of Mexicans, could perhaps mean only one thing—that
Mexicans, and especially because they are more likely to have no more than an 11th grade
education than whites and blacks, are paid less. They are paid less because they lack the
necessary skills to be attractive to employers. But it may also be the case that because Mexican-
born workers have historically been perceived as foreigners providing cheap labor, they continue
to be the victims of stereotype (Nil-Amoo Dodoo and Pinon 1994). And this reality alone, as
Table 7 shows, suggests that there is a population ripe for grassroots political organization.
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Table 7 Comparative Income Figures (Average Annual Personal Incomes)
     1993      2002
           All      Living Wage Non-Living       All        Living Wage Non-Living
     Cities             Wage Cities        Cities Wage Cities
Durable Goods          $30223        $31872                    $32733          $44208          $50003  $48388 
Nondurable Goods            25590          25091                      31456                    40733            43248    52125
Machine Operators,
Assemblers & Inspect            17344          15877                     18267            26116          23461    28706
Machine Operators, Assemblers       
and Inspectors            18857            18646                      17708                    26776            26289                    28445
Mexican                                 13117            12728                      14872                    20443            20189    21738
White            19233            18651                     17986            27158           26494    28289 
Black                                      17060            19105                      18549                    26301            26380                    29553
Handler, Equipment Cleaners,
Helpers and Laborers            13651          13887                      13435                    19422            19279                    19500
Mexican                        13024            14855                                           9350                     18961            18914    20521
White                                     13785            14320                      13477                    19436            18736                    19177
Black                                      13104           11867                       13687                    20194            22022                    20375
No More than an 11th 
Grade Education  8447             8154                    9775            10041          10397    10821
Mexican  8244             8406                         8388            12503          13122    12737
White                                       8744             8448                         9474                    10307            10848                    11151
Black                                        6903             6955                         6516                      9065              8373      9645
Mexican                                             10262           10355                       10320                    16832            17956    16116
White                                                  20391           21164                       23809                    31758            34246                    37578
Black                                                  13999           15125                       15342                    22265            22333                    25730
First Quintile  5879             5527                         5835                      8462              8050                      8657
Mexican              4848             4584         5284              7978              7751                      8213
White                                        6071            5721                          6122                      8730             8304                      8920  
Black                                        5249             4978                          5330                     7912              7733                      8223
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As Table 7 males clear, whites routinely earn above average for Machine Operators, Assemblers
and Inspectors. Although blacks earn less than whites, their average annual incomes are still
closer to the average, and even more so by 2002. It is Mexicans who earn considerably below the
average within this occupational category. On average while blacks earn 68-71 percent of whites,
Mexicans earn 43-58 (non-living wage cities in 2002) percent of whites. In living wage cities,
Mexicans earned 48.9 percent of whites in 1993 and 52.4 percent of whites in 2002. This
compares to blacks earning 71.5 percent of whites in 1993 and 65.2 percent of whites in 2002.
Compared to whites, then, one could theoretically argue that whereas blacks had a relative wage
decline, Mexicans had a relative wage increase. In fact, the proportionate decline among blacks is
greater than the proportionate increase among Mexicans. Nevertheless, these findings appear to
be consistent with much of the literature on immigration. That is, Mexicans appear to not fare as
well as other groups, which would imply that they may stand to benefit the most from organizing
efforts. 
Still, the fact remains: Mexicans have lower personal incomes on average than whites and
blacks, particularly in the first quintile. By 2002, however, the gap in the first quintile is not as
great, and in some cases, Mexicans’ personal incomes equal those of blacks, and even exceeds
them.  And yet, the biggest change between 1993 and 2002 appears to be among those with no
more than an 11th grade education. In 1993, Mexicans with no more than an 11th grade education
were earning less than whites with similarly low educational attainment, but they were earning
more than blacks. And this was the case in both living wage and non-living wage cities as well as
the nation as a whole. By 2002, Mexicans with low educational attainment were earning more
than all those with low educational attainment, and they were particularly earning more than
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whites with similarly low educational attainment. This too is consistent with the literature that
over time they do achieve earnings gains. And yet, despite their relative gains by 2002, it is
nonetheless suggestive that at least in 1993 prior to any city’s passage of a living wage ordinance,
Mexicans are paid lower than others when controlling for the effects of low educational
attainment. The question then arises as to whether the relative increase among Mexicans with
low educational attainment is in any way indicative of the effect that living wage ordinances may
have had in those cities. Also for the exception of non-living wage cities in 2002, Mexicans
working as Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers, and Laborers were earning less than whites
in the same occupations. What is important is that Mexicans who tend to be highly concentrated
in living wage cities, and who disproportionately have higher percentages with no more than an
11th grade education, have generally lower incomes. And in those occupations that they are more
likely to be working in, they are often earning less than their white and black counterparts.
Though this is far from conclusive, it may still speak volumes to why there is a greater disparity
in incomes between the top and the bottom in living wage cities than in non living wage cities
and the nation as a whole. George Borjas (1990), for instance, suggests that because recent waves
of immigrants are relatively unskilled, they are more likely to participate in the welfare system
and be non-participants in the workforce than earlier waves. But that they come with fewer skills
means they are also responsible for significant reductions in the potential national income of the
United States. To the extent that they may be depressing wages among those at the bottom of the
distribution, this might explain why income inequality is greater in those cities where they tend to
be concentrated.
There is also the question of why immigrants were necessarily attracted to those cities
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that would ultimately pass ordinances. The CPS data is suggestive in that it reveals living wage
cities to have more jobs in those occupations and industries that Mexicans appear to gravitate
towards. Mexican immigration has never been spread evenly among the 50 states. Rather, a few
key states, mostly in the Southwest, tended to attract a large majority from Mexico. Jorge
Durand, Douglas Massey and Fernando Charvet (2000) identify four key historical junctures in
Mexican immigration to the United States. The first was the classic era of open immigration,
which was prior to the restrictive policies of the 1920s. The second was the Bracero era of 1942-
1964, whereby the U.S. sponsored large temporary workers programs. The third was the era of
undocumented migration, running from the Bracero program til passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (ICRA) of 1986. And the fourth is the post ICRA era, which runs from
1987 til the present, whereby the U.S. government has sought to suppress undocumented
migration through increasingly repressive actions. During the classic era, Mexican immigration
flowed primarily to Texas, California, and Arizona. But following the massive legalization,
Mexican immigrants began to spread out. ICRA essentially had two effects: First it flooded local
labor markets with newly legalized immigrants, and second it afforded them the freedom to
move. The percentage of immigrants going to non-gateway states rose from 13 percent to 31
percent, and by the 1990s, nearly 1/3 of all Mexicans were settling in non-gateway states. This
movement away from California and Texas was initially led by young single men who had been
working in agriculture. By the mid -1990s they had already begun moving into urban
employment where they were also joined by a growing number of Mexican women.  
There are, of course, a variety of factors that account for why those cities that passed
ordinances did so, not least of which is each city’s respective governing regime. There is no way
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to get at that through this particular CPS data, but what the CPS data does provide is some
insight into the demographic characteristics that perhaps made these cities more amenable to the
appeals of living wage campaigns. Can we then say that those cities with the demographic
profiles that the living wage cities in this sample display are more likely to pass living wage
ordinances in large part because they have the types of populations that might be ripe for
grassroots political organization? Such a statement would be speculative at best, as the data here
does not easily establish that. At best it lends itself to inference. That is, we can infer that those
cities with large immigrant populations with low educational attainment also effectively have
sizeable labor markets at the low end of the income distribution. Because of this reality alone,
they might offer greater opportunity for living wage campaigns to organize these workers behind
their cause and to empower them within their coalitions. Or stated another way, because there are
larger numbers of workers who are more likely to be at the bottom end of the wage scale, they in
turn have greater incentive to join in living wage campaigns because they are also in a position to
derive benefit. 
Ruth Milkman (2000), for instance, suggests that in the Los Angeles area (also one of the
cities among the living wage city group) that Latino immigrant workers, despite the fact they are
undocumented and also the widespread belief that such workers are very difficult to organize,
nonetheless are at the core of the L.A. labor movement’s revival. Immigrants have historically
been less likely than native-born workers to join unions, especially in Los Angeles which always
had a reputation as an anti-union “company town.” Still, prospects for unionizing are good, in
large part because immigrant workers rely heavily on ethnic social networks for housing, jobs
and other basic needs, and this may make it easier to recruit them into the labor movement.
41
Moreover, labor unions are able to extend a helping hand to immigrant workers by offering them
economic and political resources that can ameliorate conditions of daily life. These immigrants
have not only become the lifeblood of L.A.’s sprawling metropolis, but they have also become
the core of its contemporary low-wage nonunion workforce. In that they are positioned to be
organized by unions, they are similarly positioned to be organized by a campaign for a living
wage. This might then also imply the converse: those cities that have smaller populations likely
to be working in the low wage labor market are perhaps less likely to be organized because there
is less potential for mobilization. And because there are larger numbers of people who are better
positioned to earn better wages, there is less incentive to be supportive of such campaigns. 
Therefore, it would seem plausible to infer that in order for a city to be predisposed
towards passing such ordinances, there must at a minimum be a population that stands to benefit.
This population stands to benefit because it lacks the requisite education and skills to command
higher wages. And they stand to benefit because they may be an immigrant population that is
perhaps being exploited because 1) they lack understanding of the labor market and/or adequate
language skills to negotiate better; and 2) they lack the educational attainment essential for
moving out of the bottom end of the distribution. It is telling that those cities that passed
ordinances have large Mexican populations, as well as large populations from other Central and
South American countries. And this seems to be more important than the fact that these cities
also had larger numbers of individuals who never attained more than an 11th grade education,
who had never worked, who worked in lower paying occupations such as machine operatives,
assemblers and inspectors; and handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers and laborers. This does,
however, raise another question for future research: just what is the racial and/or ethnic
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composition of those living wage campaigns that have successfully secured passage of
ordinances.
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